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The majority answered this by citing a great deal of statute and case
law, to show that classification by population is valid and well entrenched by precedent. Following the test in the Stapleton case, the
Court did find a reasonable connection, in that the legislature was apparently segregating the smaller counties according to varying economic resources, based on population. But it was also emphasized
that ".... where the reference to population serves only to designate
and identify the place... it will be deemed a local act." 2
By inquiring into the actual effect of the law to hold it valid under
Article III, Section 17, thus apparently abolishing the significance of
the old distinction between the terms and the effect, the scope of judicial investigation was extended and the rationale of the Stapleton case
clarified. However, although the ban against designation as opposed
Court's insistence that only
to classification gives some criteria, the
"some reasonableand possible basis" 30 need be found, leaves a very
difficult test. The fine line of distinction between the presumed possible basis and the results of a vivid imagination is, and will be, very
difficult for the courts to apply.

ToRTs-LBEL AND SrNDER-OuiAL AccusATioN OF COMMU-

PER S -An engineer- brought an action for
NOT SrANR
slander against his employer, a corporation engaged in the manufacture of implements for the United States Government. The complaint
alleged that the defendant's president spoke words falsely accusing the
plaintiff of being a communist. The Court of Appeals held that the
words spoken are not slanderous per se and absent a sufficient allegation of special damages, the complaint failed to state a cause of action.
Gurtlerv. Union PartsMfg. Co., 1 N.Y2d 5, 132 N.E2d 889 (1956).
It has generally been held that a falsely written accusation of
communism is libelous 1 and actionable per se.2 Courts have reached
this decision by taking judicial notice of the current climate of
opinion,3 while others have sustained the action on statutes making
party membership a bar to governmental employment 4 However, the
NISm
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9 Farrington v. PincIMey, 1 N.Y.2a 74, 81, 133 N.E2d 817, 822 (1956).
so Id.at 89, 133 N.E2A at 828.
tends to expose
I Libel is actionable without proof of special damages if ita person to hatred, contempt or aversion, or to induce an evil or unsavory
opinion of him in the minds of a substantial number of the community or tQ
disparage him in the way -of his office, trade or profession. See Mencher v.

Chesley, 297 N.Y. 94, 75 N.E2.d 257 (1947) ; Nichols v. Item Publishers, Inc.,
309 N.Y. 596, 132 N.E.2d 860 (1956).
2 See, e.g., Wright v. Farm Journal, Inc., 158 F2d 976 (2d Cir. 1947);
Grant v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 151 F2d 733 (2d Cir. 1945).
3 See Mencher v. Chesley, 297 N.Y. 94, 75 N.E2d 257 (1947).
4 Levy v. Gelber, 175 Misc. 746, 25 N.Y.S2d 148 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
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jurisdictions have not been uniform in determining whether an oral
accusation of communism is actionable per se. 5 Utilizing judicial
notice, the Florida Supreme Court held that the charge was necessarily injurious to the plaintiff in his social, official and business relations and was sufficient without special damages being pleaded and
proved. 6 In Pennsylvania, the utterance was found to be slander
per se, the court basing its decision on a statute making membership
in the Communist Party a crime. 7 The court felt that calling a person
a communist imputed membership in the party. The Missouri
Supreme Court held the charge to be slander per se even though there
was no prevailing state legislation making it a crime to be a communist. 8 It was decided that the language charged the commission
of a crime under a federal statute. In Remington v. Bentley,9 a government economist was orally accused of being a communist. The
Federal District Court held that the statement by itself was of a
character to be particularly disparaging to one engaged in such an
occupation. The rationale of the court was that it was a natural presumption that an economist who was a communist would adhere to the
theories of communism which are repugnant to the democratic doctrines of the United States.
Contrary to the preceding cases, the Ohio Supreme Court agreed
that the statement would subject the plaintiff to public hatred, contempt and ridicule by a majority of American citizens; however, upon
analyzing the distinction between libel and slander, the court found
that the allegation was inadequate without pleading and proving
special damages.' 0
New York courts have followed the same trend as the Supreme
Court of Ohio. One notable case found the complaint insufficient for
the per se classification without an allegation concerning the plaintiff
in his business." The court stated that it can not be said as a matter
of law whether the words did or did not concern the complainant in his
business or tend to injure him therein. Another holding for a defendant was that it is better to discourage communists from using our
courts for propaganda purposes and that our safety is best preserved
by encouraging the exposure of communists.' 2 In the instant case,
5To

maintain a cause of action for slander, proof of actual damages of a

pecuniary nature must be alleged and proven unless the false utterance imputes
to the party commission of a crime involving moral turpitude, unfitness in profession, trade or duties of employment, a contagious disease, or unchastity to a
woman. See Pollard v. Lyon, 91 U.S. 225 (1875); Keefe v. O'Brien, 203
Misc. 113, 116 N.Y.S.2d 286 (Sup. Ct. 1952); Bennett v. Seimiller, 175 Kan.
764, 6267 P.2d 926 (1954).
Joopanenko v. Gavagan, 67 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 1953).
7 Solosko v. Paxton, 383 Pa. 419, 119 A2d 230 (1956) (per curiam).
8 Lightfoot v. Jennings, 363 Mo. 878, 254 S.W.2d 596 (1953).
1188 F. Supp. 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
10 Pecyk v. Semoncheck, 105 N.E.2d 61 (Ohio 1952).
I" Krumholtz v. Raffer, 195 Misc. 788, 91 N.Y.S.2d 743 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
12 Keefe v. O'Brien, 203 Misc. 113, 116 N.Y.S.2d 286 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
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New York, by adherence to the distinction between the defamatory
actions, 13 followed the consistency of its lower courts in denying the
complaint without the allegation of special damages.
It has been held in New York that the statement that one is an
14
"Anarchist" imputes a violation of the state criminal anarchy law.
Certainly, it would seem that the word "Communist" has today acquired a meaning as unequivocally derogatory and criminal as did
"Anarchist" in its day. There has been consistent legislation, both
federal and state, against the activities of communists and it would
seem plausible that an oral accusation of communism would infer a
violation of the Smith Act. 15 This would follow the Missouri case 16
which seems clearly correct. Nevertheless, in the principal case, the
Court rejected the plaintiff's contention that an oral accusation of
communism was actionable per se as a violation of the federal
legislation.
The continual threat of communism and the public aversion
towards its members, sympathizers, and organization in the United
States has made the oral charge of communism highly offensive to a
person's reputation. Yet, the inflexibility of the law of slander has
curtailed relief. The expansion of the narrow categories of slander
per se or the abolition of the distinction between the two defamatory
actions would seem advisable.

13

The historical distinction between the two actions of defamation is gen-

erally that libel is written and slander spoken. It has been maintained primarily
because of the permanence and sting of libel, disregarding the theory that the
distinction is mainly an historical accident. See Ostrowe v. Lee, 256 N.Y. 36,
175 N.E. 505 (1931); Thorley v. Lord Kerry, 4 Taunt. 355, 128 Eng. Rep. 367
(C.P. 1812); 8 HoLDsWORTH, HIsToRY Or ENGLISH LAw 361-78 (1926);
Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 4 COLUm. L. REv.

33 (1904).

14 Von Gerichten v. Seitz, 94 App. Div. 130, 87 N.Y. Supp. 968 (4th Dep't

1904).
15 62

STAT. 808 (1948) ; 18 U.S.C.A. § 2385 (1951).
16 Lightfoot v. Jennings, 363 Mo. 878, 254 S.W2d 596 (1953).

